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Turkish GVP Module VI Annex 1 – RMPs for COVID-19 Vaccines

English translation of TİTCK GVP Module VI Annex 1: core requirements for risk management plans of COVID-19 vaccines in Turkey.

Published: 2022-03-23 · Source: TİTCK

This text is provided for reference. The official version is published by the Turkish Medicines and Medical Devices Agency (TİTCK).

Section I – Introduction

1.1. Introduction and purpose

This document was prepared for planning the post-marketing follow-up of COVID-19 vaccines and aims to provide additional guidance on preparing risk management plans (RMPs).

The core requirements in this guideline should be read and applied in the context of the pandemic use of COVID-19 vaccines and together with the existing relevant guidelines (Good Pharmacovigilance Practices (GVP) Module I – Management and reporting of adverse reactions to medicinal products, Module VI – Risk management systems, and Module VII – Signal management).

Section II – Structures and Processes

2.1. Structure of the risk management plan

The RMP prepared for a COVID-19 vaccine must include the additional information set out below.

2.2. RMP Part I "General information"

If the RMP contains information on both the originally approved vaccine and a vaccine containing different/additional strains, the administrative details must be presented separately in this part.

2.3. RMP Part II "Safety specification"

2.3.1. RMP Module I "Epidemiology of the indications and target populations"

This section should reflect current knowledge of COVID-19, acknowledging the existing uncertainties.

2.3.2. RMP Module II "Non-clinical part of the safety specification"

Where available, this section should be included in the first versions of the RMP submitted with the initial marketing authorisation / emergency use authorisation (EUA) application.

2.3.3. RMP Module III "Clinical trial exposure"

It is acknowledged that final exposure and follow-up data will only be available once the clinical trial reports are finalised. However, providing information from the protocols of ongoing trials without delay will facilitate the assessment.

Additional clinical trial data obtained after approval (including for different/additional strains) should be included as appropriate.

2.3.4. RMP Module IV "Populations not studied in clinical trials"

The recommendation given for Module III applies.

2.3.5. RMP Module V "Post-authorisation experience"

Information available since the vaccine was approved, or made available under emergency use, in other regions of the world and in Türkiye should be provided.

Post-approval RMP updates should include data on use with the marketed formulations.

2.3.6. RMP Module VI "Additional requirements for the safety specification requested by other health authorities"

Up-to-date information should be included where applicable.

2.3.7. RMP Module VII "Identified and potential risks"

It is acknowledged that only limited information may be available in the early stages of applications while clinical trials are ongoing. A more complete safety specification in the RMP will only be available once preliminary clinical trial results are available (e.g. at the time of the efficacy endpoint analysis) and once further data from the same trials have been generated after approval.

In addition, applicants should take the following into account when building the safety specification:

  • The vaccine construct and formulation (including risks identified for other approved COVID-19 vaccines using similar technology),
  • Degradation of the active substance/antigen and its potential impact on safety (e.g. for mRNA-based vaccines),
  • The presence of an adjuvant,
  • Any important potential risks that may be specific to COVID-19 vaccination (e.g. vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory disease).

Even if the initial considerations for a vaccine are generally guided by previous clinical and non-clinical experience with vaccines using the same construct/platform, or with other COVID-19 vaccines from the same or other manufacturers, it is essential that every decision on classifying a (potential) risk of the vaccine is evidence-based and adequately presented and justified in RMP Module VII.

When clinical trial results do not reveal specific safety concerns, it may be acceptable not to include important identified risks in the RMP.

The list of important potential risks should include risks for which there is clinical and/or non-clinical evidence suggesting a causal association with the vaccine, but where the strength of the evidence is not yet sufficient to draw a conclusion, and which have a potential impact on the benefit-risk balance. Some important potential risks may derive from the vaccine construct/platform, non-clinical data or clinical trials, while others may derive from evolving global knowledge of COVID-19 and of the vaccines themselves, or may be based on more theoretical considerations (e.g. vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory disease, immune-mediated disorders).

Applicants should prepare a well-justified list of the important potential risks for which evidence as described above exists, rather than an exhaustive list of all theoretical risks for vaccines in general. Such theoretical risks may be included in the list of adverse events of special interest (AESI) to be followed up through routine and additional pharmacovigilance activities. The AESI list should be described in the RMP Module VII sub-section "New safety concerns identified", but not in the sub-sections "Recent study reports with implications for safety concerns" or "Details of important identified and potential risks from clinical development and post-authorisation experience". The related pharmacovigilance activities should be designed so that they can monitor existing safety concerns and detect new ones. Activities should be planned so that AESI are prioritised in addition to important risks (identified or potential) and missing information. If new safety concerns arise after strains are changed/added, this should be presented in this section and highlighted in the summary of safety concerns.

In clinical trials, sub-populations may not have been included because they fell under the exclusion criteria. Not every excluded sub-population necessarily has to appear as missing information in the RMP "summary of safety concerns". Where clinical trial data in these populations are not considered comprehensive, and based on the available evidence and concerns, the inclusion of the following missing information in the RMP should be considered:

  • Use in pregnancy and breastfeeding,
  • Safety in patients with severe co-morbidities
  • Use in immunocompromised persons
  • Use in frail persons with unstable health conditions and co-morbidities (e.g. chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, chronic neurological disease, cardiovascular disorders, autoimmune disorders or inflammatory disorders),
  • Safety in children (if there is an approved indication),
  • Long-term safety,
  • Interaction with other vaccines.

Other considerations regarding RMP Module VII "Identified and potential risks" for COVID-19 vaccines:

  • Reactogenicity:
  • If the vaccine showed a higher reactogenicity profile than the control in clinical trials (especially if the control is another vaccine that already has a high reactogenicity profile), this higher reactogenicity, its impact on the safety profile and the necessary risk minimisation measures should be discussed in the RMP.
  • Reactogenicity in subgroups (such as frail persons) and the risk of flare-ups in patients with chronic inflammatory conditions should be discussed.
  • Where applicable, differences in reactogenicity with a second (or subsequent) dose should be discussed.
  • If additional strains are added to the vaccine (e.g. the effect of multiple antigens; an increased amount of active substance), the impact on reactogenicity and overall tolerability should be discussed.
  • Where they may increase the risk of adverse reactions, aspects of the formulation and preparation of the vaccine should be discussed. For example, a formulation requiring a diluent to be added for reconstitution may affect sterility and lead to clinical reactions (such as increased local reactions or abscesses).
  • Where two (or more) doses are recommended, the risk of discontinuing vaccination (e.g. because of reactogenicity) should be assessed alongside the risk of developing the disease. Different administration recommendations (e.g. administering a second dose with the modified/additional-strain product instead of the original product, or a subsequent dose with the modified/additional-strain product after complete vaccination with the original product) should be discussed.
  • Any early signal from clinical trials should be adequately documented and discussed in this section.
  • The importance of long-term follow-up should be discussed and adequate pharmacovigilance activities considered. The challenges of using ongoing clinical trials for this purpose (e.g. maintaining blinding) should be presented.

Topics that applicants should consider further, but which do not necessarily have to be discussed in the RMP:

  • Risks of vaccination errors in the context of mass vaccination campaigns, including errors arising from the use of multi-dose vials: these will be followed up post-marketing and reported in summary safety reports (SSRs) proportionately to the risk. When new safety concerns related to vaccine use errors arise, summary reviews are expected to be submitted promptly and, in any case, included in PBRERs.
  • The safety impact of mixed schedules (following a heterologous booster strategy or when formulations with different strains are used) will be monitored post-marketing and reported in PBRERs.
  • Waning of antibodies and the need for a booster dose or revaccination should be discussed in the efficacy part of the marketing authorisation application and of the PBRER rather than in the RMP.

2.4. RMP Part III "Pharmacovigilance plan (including post-authorisation safety studies)"

2.4.1. RMP Part III sub-section "Routine pharmacovigilance activities"

This section should include planning in the pandemic context, including activities that are not routinely described in the RMP, such as signal detection and ICSR reporting. Challenges related to pandemic restrictions (e.g. due to social distancing or limited medical resources) or to the volume of adverse reaction reports to be processed (e.g. associated with a mass vaccination campaign) should be taken into account and reflected in the planning.

Signal detection and management, methodological aspects and requirements are described in GVP Module VII, which should be read together with the EMA guideline "Good Pharmacovigilance Practices (GVP) Product- or Population-Specific Considerations I: Vaccines for prophylaxis against infectious diseases" [1]. Further considerations for the description in the RMP include:

  • Marketing authorisation / EUA holders should perform signal detection using every available source. The data sources used for signal detection should be specified. These include the holders' own databases, the European Union database EudraVigilance (EV), other public or private databases, literature screening and so on. Holders may use the EV database to strengthen signal management activities, for example to investigate further the signals detected in their own databases. Using a single data source for signal detection and assessment is not considered appropriate.
  • Routine signal detection methods and practices may be insufficient to screen efficiently the high volume of adverse reaction reports expected given a mass vaccination campaign. It should be taken into account that, because healthcare professionals and the public are encouraged to report certain adverse reactions to certain vaccines, disproportionality in the number of reports in the existing safety database may limit signal detection and interpretation. The reporting pattern for a vaccination campaign during a pandemic is likely to differ qualitatively from other reporting, which should be considered when performing analyses.
  • Using the infrastructure and the results of global efforts to define AESI lists, background rates (e.g. ACCESS, CONSIGN, ConcePTION) and observed-versus-expected (O/E) analyses should be part of the holders' signal detection activities. These are expected to be described in the RMP and reported in SSRs. The data sources used, the frequency at which frequent analyses are repeated and the periods for submission to the Agency should be defined and submitted for assessment.
  • The proposed AESI list should also take the following sources into account:
  • Brighton Collaboration SPEAC list [2]
  • ACCESS Project list of adverse events of special interest and case definitions [3]
  • CBER Surveillance Program – list of adverse events of special interest [4]
  • Signal detection activities should be able to detect differences in the safety profile of the vaccine containing changed/added strains compared with the approved original formulation.

Methods that holders should consider for signal detection activities include, but are not limited to:

  • Time-to-onset (TTO) analysis,
  • Time series analyses and algorithms that may help detect problems in a series and spurious reports,
  • Cluster analyses to help identify groups of ICSRs that may point to syndromes (e.g. narcolepsy and the A/H1N1 pandemic vaccines).

ICSR requirements are described in GVP Module I, which should be read together with the EMA guideline "Good Pharmacovigilance Practices (GVP) Product- or Population-Specific Considerations I: Vaccines for prophylaxis against infectious diseases" and the detailed guidance on ICSRs in the context of COVID-19 [5].

Applicants should consider specific follow-up questionnaires to obtain additional structured information on reports of the safety concerns selected in the RMP and of suspected AESI; the forms should be provided in RMP Annex 4 for assessment. The questionnaire should use the reporter's language and, where possible, ask only for information missing from the initial report. When specific follow-up questionnaire(s) are used, holders should provide process data in the PBRER (e.g. response rate, need for corrective actions) and reassess the need to continue this routine pharmacovigilance activity.

To facilitate a rapid review of the safety profile of COVID-19 vaccines and to detect safety changes that may point to new signals during the pandemic, holders of marketing authorisations / EUAs for COVID-19 vaccines are required to submit SSRs to the Agency. Submitting these reports does not replace the submission of PBRERs but complements it. SSRs should initially cover one month and be submitted to the Agency. The data lock point (DLP) is the last day of the month and submission is on the 15th of the following month; the reporting period, DLP and submission date are adjusted when the submission frequency changes (e.g. for bimonthly submission: the reporting period covers two months, the DLP is the 15th of the previous month and submission is on the 10th of the month). The Agency assesses whether, and how often, SSRs must continue to be submitted.

Changes to the SSR submission frequency may be planned, or the requirement to submit SSRs may be lifted, in the following situations: 1. a change in exposure during the mass vaccination campaign, 2. formulation changes that may give rise to new safety concerns, 3. the addition to the indication of a new population with limited characterisation of the safety profile, 4. the addition of a booster dose, 5. robust safety data from observational studies or spontaneous reports after the vaccine has been used in large numbers of people, 6. the evolution of the pandemic and the vaccination strategy in Türkiye, 7. evidence on safety issues with similar vaccines.

The sections of the SSR should include at least:

  • The number of adverse reaction reports in the interval and cumulatively, overall, by age group and by special population (e.g. pregnant women),
  • The number of reports in the interval and cumulatively by High Level Term (HLT) and System Organ Class (SOC),
  • Stratified exposure data (where possible based on doses administered rather than doses distributed, and stratified by region, age group, sex and dose number),
  • Changes to the reference safety information during the interval and measures taken for safety reasons,
  • A list of signals ongoing and closed during the interval, including a summary of their assessment,
  • A summary of selected AESI (see Annex) and RMP safety concerns considered to need periodic review in SSR submissions: numbers of reports and relevant cases, including O/E analyses. O/E analyses should be performed cumulatively using appropriate background rates and an appropriate risk window, stratified by age group where appropriate, and presented together with a sensitivity analysis (e.g. background rates for the EU provided by ACCESS are available at http://www.encepp.eu/phact_links.shtml; if background rates for Türkiye differ and are available, those data should be used). If an increased O/E rate is detected, the issue should be subject to further assessment.
  • In the first few SSR submissions, a discussion of whether fatal cases have been observed in an unusual pattern during post-marketing use. Data on medication errors should only be included if a pattern of errors leading to harm is identified and/or requires risk minimisation activities (e.g. changes to the product information; a direct healthcare professional communication); otherwise these data should be included in the (six-monthly) PBRERs.
  • Details of the search strategies in all reviews performed by the holder, such as case definitions, and the methodology of O/E analyses, including the source of background rates, risk windows and so on,
  • Benefit-risk assessments.

The content requirements of later SSRs are defined by the assessments of earlier SSRs. If the indication changes (e.g. new populations to be vaccinated) and the safety profile in the initial indication only requires safety follow-up using pre-pandemic pharmacovigilance tools, e.g. signal detection, PBRERs and so on, the SSR content should focus on the new populations.

Once vaccine approvals have been diversified to include changed/additional strains, and the data point to a different safety profile, data presentation in the SSR should be structured "per vaccine" (original formulation and new formulation) and cumulatively. Where vaccine-specific exposure data are available, this affects the O/E analyses.

The approach followed for traceability should be described in this part of the RMP.

2.4.2. RMP Part III sub-section "Additional pharmacovigilance activities"

Continuing safety follow-up from ongoing clinical trials should be a priority and should be included as additional pharmacovigilance activities. The protocol review for long-term follow-up should take place early in the RMP assessment, before the decision, and it is acknowledged that changes at this stage may be limited in scope. Final safety results from the pivotal studies are expected to be submitted for assessment. Given the potential logistical and ethical challenges of continuing the clinical trials as originally designed once sufficient efficacy and safety data have been collected to support approval, manufacturers should plan pharmacovigilance activities early. It should be considered whether routine activities will be sufficient to further characterise the important identified and potential risks and to investigate missing information, or whether an observational post-authorisation safety study (PASS) is needed in addition to ongoing or planned clinical trials. The RMP assessment will determine which safety concerns should be the focus of the PASS; in addition, it may be appropriate to add secondary safety endpoints based on the AESI list. Protocols may be prepared taking into account the recommendations of the ENCePP Guide on Methodological Standards in Pharmacoepidemiology (http://www.encepp.eu/standards_and_guidances/methodologicalGuide.shtml) and, where available, the results of the ACCESS and CONSIGN projects.

If an observational PASS is considered necessary, the following considerations apply:

  • Since the marketing date may differ considerably between regions of the world, the PASS should include a Türkiye cohort and should not rely solely on databases outside Türkiye.
  • The key elements of a desirable PASS design will be the ability to start data collection shortly after approval and distribution of the vaccine, to perform rapid safety analyses and to report frequently to the Agency for regulatory purposes (e.g. interim results).
  • A change in vaccine formulation or the inclusion of additional strains should lead the holder to assess the suitability of the ongoing and planned PASS for investigating the safety concerns of both formulations, and to consider increasing the sample size and updating the study protocol.

Depending on vaccination policies, and while acknowledging that it will be difficult to record pregnancies in the early stages of vaccination and to include women who may become pregnant shortly after vaccination, a study may be needed to investigate further the safety and pregnancy outcomes in pregnant women (e.g. using existing pregnancy registries such as INOSS and Covi-PREG; the recommendations of the CONSIGN project may also be considered). Ensuring that pregnant women are adequately followed up in the PASS is considered useful. Effectiveness studies should be included in this part of the RMP. The effectiveness data obtained should be vaccine-specific. Effectiveness should also be measured for vaccine formulations developed to address variants.

2.5. RMP Part IV "Plans for post-authorisation efficacy studies"

There are no specific additional requirements for the RMP submission.

2.6. RMP Part V "Risk minimisation measures (including evaluation of the effectiveness of risk minimisation activities)"

In principle, it is accepted that the product information, as a routine risk minimisation activity, may be sufficient to minimise the risks of the product. Holders should consider facilitating the dissemination of the product information through public online communication channels. The holder should discuss transition plans for new formulations, including additional strains, the overlap period, and the risk minimisation measures needed to reduce the potential for mixing up different products and to manage administration errors.

2.7. RMP Part VI "Summary of activities in the risk management plan"

There is no additional requirement for the RMP summary.

2.8. RMP Part VII "Annexes"

There is no additional requirement.

Annex – Example list of topics to consider when preparing an SSR submission

TopicRequirement
Authorisation statusShould be included in the first SSR submission.
Safety activities during the reporting intervalShould be included in the first SSR submission.
ExposureShould be included in the first SSR submission. Focus on estimated interval and cumulative exposure, stratified by dose, age and sex.
Responses to previous requestsShould be included in the next SSR unless otherwise specified.
Medication errorsShould be submitted only with the PBRER, unless a significant concern emerges with the new vaccine.
Summary table of report countsShould be added where applicable.
Literature reviewShould be included in the first SSR submission.
Overview of signalsShould be included in the first SSR submission.
RMP safety concerns
AnaphylaxisExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Myocarditis/pericarditisShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Vaccine-associated enhanced disease / vaccine-associated enhanced respiratory diseaseExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Use in pregnancy and breastfeedingExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Use in immunocompromised patientsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Use in patients with autoimmune or inflammatory disordersShould be added where applicable.
Use in frail patients with co-morbiditiesExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Interaction with other vaccinesExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Long-term safety dataExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Use in childrenShould be added where applicable.
Thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome (TTS)Should be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
ThrombosisShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS)Should be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Thrombocytopenia, including immune thrombocytopenic purpuraShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Immune-mediated neurological conditionsShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Adverse events of special interest (AESI)
Anaphylactic reactionsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Cardiovascular AESIsShould be added where applicable.
COVID-19 AESIsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Dermatological AESIsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Facial paralysisExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Haematological AESIsShould be added where applicable.
Hepatic AESIsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Immune-mediated/autoimmune AESIsShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Musculoskeletal AESIsShould be added where applicable.
Neurological AESIs (including demyelination)Should be added where applicable.
Other AESIs (e.g. pyrexia, herpes zoster)Expected to be presented in the PBRER.
Pregnancy-related AESIsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Renal AESIsShould be added where applicable.
Respiratory AESIsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
StrokeShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Sudden deathExpected to be presented in the PBRER. Fatal cases should be discussed for every safety concern included in the SSR.
Thromboembolic AESIsShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Vasculitic eventsShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Eye disordersShould be included in the first SSR submission if applicable.
Gastrointestinal disordersExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Special situations/populations
DeathIn the first few SSR submissions, discuss whether fatal cases are observed in an unusual pattern; thereafter expected to be presented in the PBRER.
Lack of efficacyExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Vaccine interactionsExpected to be presented in the PBRER.
Benefit-risk evaluation and conclusionShould be included in the first SSR submission. Any proposed update to the product information should be added to this section.

Footnotes

Revision history

Revision NoRevision dateReason and explanation
115.11.2022Format updated

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